Doubt

Doubt is a concept that denotes a broad spectrum of privation or lack in relation to trust and belief. It admits of degrees as well as certain descriptive thresholds. Therefore, one can coherently speak about degrees of doubt that can have beneficial results, while maintaining that, below a certain threshold, other degrees of doubt can be deleterious. In a positive sense, doubt refers to an honest questioning of truth-claims, especially related to trust and trustworthiness that is part of the legitimate struggle within the process of forming an authentic faith. As such, doubting seeks reasonable justification for belief; it attempts to verify the trustworthiness of the object of trust. However, doubt can also refer to a negative breakdown in the discernment process whereby truth is not recognized. This decisive stall in the course of verification in which belief is suspended or trust is withheld can have various causes. As noted in my last post, previous psycho-social experiences may inhibit a person’s ability to trust. In addition, a person’s volition can hinder belief. For instance, one can willfully refuse to assent to or hedge against what is shown to be the most probable conclusion. In this sense, doubt does not describe the beneficial process of avoiding a pretentious, hypocritical faith; but rather, it refers to the antithesis of justified true belief–an ongoing state of suspended belief or trust in which one willfully refuses to embrace what is known to be the case.

Trust and Trustworthiness

As noted in my previous post on faith, the concept of trust refers to the social dimension of faith, since it involves decision and is intimately conjoined to action. Again, trust is always in something or someone–it requires an object. Trust, then, is the decision to believe and act as though something is true, right, or sufficient based on the worthiness of its object. As such, trust is something that is either given or withheld by a person depending upon his or her knowledge of the truth, reliability, or adequacy of the object. Thus, although trust (with respect to faith) is fundamentally relational in that it is a dynamic, inter-subjective response between persons, it does have an intellectual component.

Since trust is understood in a psycho-social context, the sum total of a person’s relational experiences are brought to bear on his or her ability to give trust. Indeed, prior to giving trust or entering into a vulnerable, trusting relationship, a person who has experienced unhealthy, broken, even abusive interpersonal relationships must unlearn pattens of distrust. This is to say, trust (or its privation) is something that develops over time in accordance with a person’s individual and collective life experience.

Trustworthiness is being worthy or deserving of trust. As such, it provides warrant or justification for trust. In short, trust is predicated on truth. That is, it is dependent upon a state of affairs in which the object of trust that is believed to be reliable is in fact reliable. Hence, trust may be appropriately or mistakenly given depending upon the truth status of a particular belief concerning an object. Trustworthiness, then, is a measure of the accuracy of one’s epistemological convictions (what is believed to be true) in correspondence to what is ontologically the case (what is actually true).

It is important to understand these concepts because they comprise the crux of the Christian faith: God has revealed himself in Jesus Christ as trustworthy, and therefore, deserving of our trust. The resurrection of Jesus demonstrates the reliability of his word–he loves us with an everlasting love that will never fail. In short, a trust decision concerning the trustworthiness of God is at the center of Christianity. Do you believe God’s love is true? Do you dare to trust in him by accepting his sacrifice for your sins as sufficient for salvation? Will you take the risk and receive the redemption offered through God’s anointed one and enter into a restored love relationship with him?

Here are some promises to consider as you decide whether or not to entrust yourself to God:

Many are the woes of the wicked, but the Lord’s unfailing love surrounds the man who trusts in him (Psalms 32:10, NIV).

He who gives attention to the word will find good, and blessed is he who trusts in the Lord (Proverbs 16:20, NASB).

…if you confess with your mouth, “Jesus is Lord,” and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved. For it is with your heart that you believe and are justified, and it is with your mouth that you confess and are saved. As the Scripture says, “Anyone who trusts in him will never be put to shame”…”Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.” (Romans 10:9-13, NIV; referencing Isaiah 28:16 and Joel 2:32).

What is Faith?

The position piece in the August 2008 issue of Christianity Today entitled, “Faith Is Not a Freak Show: Let’s make sure we learn the right lessons from the primary season,” makes this astute observation about civil religion in America:

“It doesn’t really matter whom Americans call God, so long as that God is for freedom and for America. In fact, now the word faith has replaced God, as the object of faith has become increasingly less important.”

The last line really stood out and resonated with my recent experience. Nowadays, it seems many self-described spiritual people simply claim to have faith in faith. Frankly, I’m not sure what that means. But in light of the popularity of this putatively inoffensive, all-inclusive, contentless definition of faith, I think it is important for Christians to clarify what they mean when they use the term faith. Here is what I take to be the biblical meaning of faith:

Faith is a state of believing, which is justified according to the reliability of the object or the subject that is being trusted. A belief is the mental assent to the truthfulness of a conclusion, that is, the noetic acceptance of its congruence with reality (the real state of affairs, things as they actually are). As such, it is formed or developed in the human mind. In other words, a person’s knowledge, feelings, and will are all significant factors in the reasoning process that precedes assent; thus, they can either foster or hinder faith. However, the main point is this–the essence of faith requires an object or a subject. In short, I must have faith in something or someone (e.g., faith in God; see Mark 11:22; 1 Thessalonians 1:8; 1 Peter 1:21).

In the New Testament the Greek term for faith (pistis) is also used to refer to a collection of beliefs–that which is believed, a body of faith, or specific teachings (Philippians 1:27; Titus 2:2; Jude 3). For Christians, this propositional content is summed up in the deliberate profession, “Jesus is Lord.” As a result, the term often denotes the acceptance of the gospel message of salvation based on the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. However, given the metaphysical nature of this conclusion, believing that the resurrection is true entails believing in the risen Jesus (John 3:16; Acts 3:12-16; Ephesians 1:15; 1 Timothy 3:13). Indeed, true knowledge about Jesus is dynamically linked to an actual encounter with him.

Consequently, in addition to rational assent, the notion of faith also conveys the relational concepts of conviction, commitment, and consecration. God is a speaking God–the initiator or the antecedent of faith. Accordingly, faith is a dependent response to God’s voice. It is submitting to God’s leading and guiding in an act of total reliance upon his promises (Acts 13:3, 14:22, 16:6-10, 23:11). Undeniably, then, faith is an ongoing, intersubjective relationship in which we assume an orientation of humble discipleship, a receptive posture of listening and learning.

Given the above discussion, it is evident that the meaning of faith includes the idea of faithfulness or trustworthiness. It requires a position of confidence in which a subject aligns his or her motives, considerations, choices, and aspirations according to the credibility and fidelity of the other. God’s faithfulness, then, logically and ontologically precipitates man’s faith. In other words, God has made himself known such that he has shown his reliability–God’s trustworthiness has been demonstrated in history and is known through revelation, tradition, reason, and experience. Hence, faith requires an initial mental assent to certain propositions about God as well as a continuing trust in a living, dynamic relationship with God.

Lastly, I am convinced that biblical faith is a dynamic, future-oriented attitude of living-in-trust. It constitutes an intersubjective relationship with God that grows and develops in knowledge and understanding through shared experience. That is, there are degrees of faith (and doubt) as well as a maturing of faith (Ephesians 4:13). As has been noted, faith is a living act of trust for a future outcome based on past reliability. In sum, faith is a receptive, trusting orientation to the unlimited possibilities present in communion with God that finds its certainty in his trustworthy nature and consistent character as revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.

For a fuller discussion see F. Gerrit Immink’s book, Faith: A Practical Theological Reconstruction. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005.

The Anthropological Argument

Upon reflection it is apparent that human nature is an enigma: people are capable of great acts of heroism, but also of horrendous acts of villiany. In the words of Blaise Pascal, “What sort of freak then is man! How novel, how monstrous, how chaotic, how paradoxical, how prodigious! Judge of all things, feeble earthworm, repository of truth, sink of doubt and error, the glory and refuse of the universe!” (Pensees, 131/434). Any worldview worth believing must answer this paradox of the human condition. Again, as Pascal observed, “Man’s greatness and wretchedness are so evident that the true religion must necessarily teach us that there is in man some great principle of greatness and some great principle of wretchedness” (Pensees, 149/430). In his argument for Christian theism Pascal proceeded to consider two appealing philosophical explanations of his time and expose their inefficiencies by presenting the following dilemma: the Stoicism of Epictetus recognized the greatness of humankind, but failed to account for its wretchedness; while the Skepticism of Michel Montaigne recognized the wretchedness of humankind, but failed to account for its greatness. Since neither view fully explained the human condition, nor could the two contrary philosophies be synthesized, Pascal offered a tertium quid or a third option. His solution was to posit humankind as a flawed version of an earlier model. He argued that the Christian doctrine of original sin best explained the human condition in which our capacities have been “defaced, yet not entirely erased” (Groothuis, On Pascal, 63).

Christian theism is able to explain human greatness as a result of being created in the image of God. And wretchedness or depravity can be traced back to the fall or original sin (Genesis 3). Thus, the human race (albeit in a finite way) reflects the likeness of God or exhibits God-like characteristics, while simultaneously possessing sinfulness, guilt, and moral corruption. Consequently, Christian theism is the best explanation for the human condition. In philosophical format, Pascal’s anthropological argument would appear as follows:

1. The doctrine of original sin implies that humans have a dual nature, both great and wretched.
2. It is observed that greatness and wretchedness obtain to the human condition.
3. Therefore, the doctrine of original sin is quite plausible.

In other words, the doctrine of original sin (humans were created great but fell into corruption) implies that humankind is capable of cognition, self-awareness, creativity, and altruism, as well as diversion, murder, deceit, and injustice; it is observed that all of these characteristics obtain to the human condition; therefore, the doctrine of original sin is quite plausible. The hypothesis fits the facts better than rival views, therefore it is considered true to reality.

The form of the anthropological argument is abductive rather than deductive or inductive. Pascal preferred to appeal to a compelling explanation rather than to argue for Christian theism through the more traditional “proofs” of natural theology. The argument, then, is a theological hypothesis used to explain the surprising historical observation of the dual nature of the human condition. This abductive form of reasoning is often used convincingly in scientific theories and legal cases where a hypothesis is presented as the best explanation for the evidence.

Admittedly, the doctrine of original sin is confrontational. However, it is not unreasonable. Critics may claim it is an affront to reason, but it is not illogical. It fits the facts and explains the human enigma: great and depraved. As Pascal confidently asserted, no other worldview or religion solves the riddle or offers so compelling an explanation as the claim of the Christian religion (Pensees, 149/430).

If successful, the anthropological argument demonstrates the existence of the Judeo-Christian God. The advantage is that the biblical revelation of God, in particular, is justified; whereas, the cosmological and design arguments simply support a general theism. Since the Judeo-Christian worldview is the best explanation for the duality of the human condition, all of the following biblical attributes of God obtain: aseity, omnipresence, omnipotence, omniscience, transcendence, immanence, sovereignty, holiness, righteousness, and love, etc. Moreover, it is also possible to draw some conclusions from negation or to describe what God is not. That is, it can be reasoned that depravity is antithetical to God. God is not wretched, finite, proud, deceitful, hateful, envious, transitory, or profane. In short, Pascal avoided the traditional “proofs” for God’s existence because the God derived from natural theology was merely the God of Deism and not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

As an abductive or best explanation hypothesis, the anthropological argument demonstrates that Christian theism is a rationally justified belief. Christianity is respectable or “worthy or reverence” as an explanation for human nature (Pensees, 12/187). The argument provides enough to make Christian theism rationally permissible or intellectually respectable. However, because other explanations exist, one is not necessarily epistemically obligated to believe. For example, it would not be irrational to remain agnostic. That is to say, the argument provides a “weak rationality” for Christian theism.

Recognizing the “weak rationality” of his argument and the possibility of persisting in agnosticism, Pascal granted equiprobability for the sake of his famous wager (Pensees, 418/233). In the face of ongoing agnosticism, the wager forces one to choose either to believe that God exists or that God does not exist (not choosing has the same results as choosing not to believe in God). Given an equal chance and finite stakes the following results obtain from the wager: If one bets that God exists and theism is true, there is infinite gain. If one bets that God exists and theism is false, there is virtually nothing to lose (finite stakes). However, if one bets that God does not exist and theism is true, there is infinite loss. If one bets that God does not exist and theism is false, there is virtually nothing to gain (finite stakes). Consequently, prudential reason dictates that it is irrational not to believe in God, thereby shifting the case for theism from “weak rationality” to “strong rationality.” Thus, the rational person is obliged to believe that God exists.

 

References:

Groothuis, Douglas. “Deposed Royalty: Pascal’s Anthropological Argument.” Available from http://www.ivpress.com/groothuis/pdf.php/doug/000073.pdf. Accessed 31 July 2008.

________. On Pascal. Wadsworth, 2003.

Pascal, Blaise. Pensees. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.

Velarde, Robert. “Greatness and Wretchedness: The Usefulness of Pascal’s Anthropological Argument in Apologetics.” Christian Research Journal 27, no. 2 (2004). Available from http://www.equip.org/site/c.muI1LaMNJrE/b.2790935/k.B34E/JAP500.htm. Accessed 31 July 2008.

Questions of Existence

 

What does it mean to be

a son or a daughter

of Job?

What does it mean to die

for the father’s integrity,

to be struck by iniquity,

smote by the adversary?

 

What does it mean to be

descended from Abraham,

to be the test of the father’s love

for another?

What does it mean to be

the fulfillment of faithfulness,

to be the promise,

the hope of a nation,

tied to an altar?

 

What does it mean to be

the anointed one,

the embodiment of the promise

that missed everyone’s expectations?

What does it mean to refrain

from grasping what is yours

when it is slipping away,

to bring life by letting it go?

What does it mean to bring blessing

by becoming a curse?

 

The Ontological Argument

In contrast to the cosmological and teleological (design) arguments, which are a posteriori or based on observation and empirical experience, the ontological argument is an attempt to deduce the existence of God from the idea of God. That is, it is an a priori argument rooted in understanding the meaning or definition of God (it has been coined the ontological argument from the word ontology, which is derived from the Greek term for being, since it seeks to prove the being or existence of God). The following formulation of this kind of argument comes from Anselm’s Proslogion (Chapter II):

1. The idea of God is that of a maximal being, “that than which greater cannot be conceived.”
2. God exists either in the understanding only or in the understanding and in objective reality.
3. If God exists only in the understanding, then there is a being greater than God, namely, a being that exists in the understanding and in objective reality.
4. It is absurd to think there is a being greater than God. By definition this would be impossible.
5. Therefore, God exists in objective reality.

The most common objection to the ontological argument in contemporary philosophy originated with Immanuel Kant. In short, Kant claimed Anselm illegitimately moved from conceptual existence (an idea) to actual existence (a being – the instantiation of that idea in the real world). His counterargument can be stated like this:

1. Anselm’s proof depends on the idea that existence is a perfection.
2. If existence is a perfection it must be attributed or predicated to God.
3. But, existence is not a predicate, it is merely the copula of a judgment (a form of the verb “to be” connecting the subject and predicate), it adds no conceptual substance to the idea.
4. Therefore, Anselm’s argument is false.

However, one can argue that existence does seem to add something of substance to certain concepts when it is not presupposed in the dialogue, and therefore, existence is a justifiable predicate in some cases. In other words, attributing existence to the Loch Ness Monster, “Nessie,” would change my concept of the creature. Likewise, there is a legitimate difference between the concept of a character in a story that is fictitious and the concept of a character in a narrative that is historical. For instance, fictional characters don’t impact or change the real world (even though their authors do through writing).

Nevertheless, even prior to Kant, Thomas Aquinas had two objections to Anselm’s argument. First, he held that in God, and only in God, existence (esse) and essence (essentia) were identical. Since God’s essence is to exist, then, it is only if he does exist that he has any essence at all. And because Aquinas did not think it was possible to know the divine essence it was clearly misguided to attempt to prove God’s existence from God’s essence. Thus, Aquinas considered the ontological argument invalid and concentrated on finding evidence of God’s existence from his effects. Second, Aquinas faulted Anselm’s definition of God – “that than which greater cannot be conceived” – for being too vague. That is, the fact that we cannot conceive of anything greater might simply occur because the definition lacks intelligible content.

In defense of Anselm’s argument, one might argue that we do not need to fully comprehend God’s essence in order for the argument to work. And there is no reason to assume with Aquinas that God’s essence is entirely ineffable. Indeed, it seems we can have an adequate idea of a maximal being – a being with supreme power and freedom – without completely figuring out everything entailed by it. All that the argument requires is that we be able to compare other beings to the idea of God in terms of greatness.

The argument appears valid and sound to me; however, I must admit the significance of the original context of the argument is also an issue: Anselm framed it in prayer (see his Proslogion, Chapters II-IV) because he believed that a certain disposition was required to free the intellect from things that obstruct understanding. It is only upon believing and obeying the revealed mysteries of God that one is properly positioned to gain a deeper understanding of them through reflection and analysis, which supply evidence to support what is already known by faith. Thus, despite the apparent neutrality of Anselm’s definition of God, it may presuppose a Christian perspective that identifies God with the ground of existence such that it is contradictory to both think of him and to think of him as non-existent. In conclusion, whether or not the argument provides rational assurance of the existence of God might depend upon one’s initial epistemic position: one may need to believe in order to understand.

 

References

Anselm, Proslogion. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/anselm/basic_works.iii.iii.html.

Davis, Stephen T. God, Reason & Theistic Proofs. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997.

Mascall, Eric Lionel. “Faith and Reason: Anselm and Aquinas.” Journal of Theological Studies (14 April 1963): 67-90.

The Moral Argument

If we hold that objective moral values and duties do exist, then we have good reason to believe in the existence of God. That is, if objective evaluations (moral principles) exist, they must be derived from an objective evaluator. Although he eventually comes to a rather desperate conclusion, Arthur Allen Leff makes this point very well in his article, “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law,” Duke Law Journal 6 (December 1979): 1230. It is worth quoting at length:

Imagine, now, a legal system based upon perceived normative propositions – oughts – which are absolutely binding, wholly unquestionable, once found. Consider the normative proposition, “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” Under what circumstances, if any, would one conclude that it is wrong to commit adultery? Maybe it helps to put the question another way: when would it be impermissible to make the formal intellectual equivalent of what is known in barrooms and schoolyards as “the grand sez who”? Putting it that way makes it clear that if we are looking for an evaluation, we must actually be looking for an evaluator: some machine for the generation of judgments on states of affairs. If the evaluation is to be beyond question, then the evaluator and its evaluative processes must be similarly insulated. If it is to fulfill its role, the evaluator must be the unjudged judge, the unruled legislator, the premise maker who rests on no premises, the uncreated creator of values. Now, what would you call such a thing if it existed? You would call it Him.

In sum, a theistic worldview provides the only adequate justification for objective moral values. God is the source of the moral law, which is grounded in his abiding good nature or essential character. The formal argument is succinctly expressed as follows by J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig in their book, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview:

1. If God did not exist, objective moral values and duties would not exist.
2. Objective moral values and duties do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Premise (1): Although some philosophers, such as Kai Nielsen, have argued for an objective morality without God, I find their case unpersuasive. For one thing, they do not seem able to answer the metaethical question, “Sez who?” Who places moral obligations on me? What’s more, if atheism is true, there is no final accountability for one’s actions; thus, all things are permitted. Lastly, Why should a person ever sacrifice their own self-interest for the sake of another? In the absence of God we are left with some variety of egoism. In other words, if morality is merely a social convention, personal preference, or arbitrary decision, then self-sacrificial or altruistic behavior is simply foolish.

Premise (2): There are some actions that are morally wrong regardless of one’s personal preference or socio-cultural conditioning, such as rape, murder, and torturing the innocent for pleasure. Although Ruth Benedict and others have argued for various forms of ethical relativism (moral right and wrong are either individually or culturally determined), these theories provide neither a means of adjudicating between competing value claims nor a basis for moral reform. Besides, the central diversity thesis of ethical relativism is flawed: cultural diversity does not entail ethical diversity (multiple moralities). Moreover, there may be less underlying diversity between cultures than relativists claim. In his article, “Ethical Relativity: Sic et Non,” Journal of Philosophy 52 (1955): 663-77, Harvard anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn persuasively argues that cultural differences can be compatible with universal moral concepts. The same objective ethical principles may be practiced differently in different societies because the variations are superficial rather than basic. That is, the ethical intent is the same even though different cultures might implement different rules (there is a core likeness despite cultural coverings). Thus, the historian Herodotus was mistaken to suggest that “custom is the king o’er all.”

Premise (3): The best explanation for the existence of objective moral values and duties is the existence of a righteous, personal God. On the condition of ethical objectivism, it is most reasonable to conclude that God is the originator of the moral law, which is in keeping with his holy character and the nature of his creation.

The Design Argument

Here is the basic argument from design for the existence of God:

1. The fine-tuning of the universe for intelligent life is due either to physical necessity, chance, or design.
2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
3. Therefore, it is due to design.
4. Design comes only from a mind, a designer.
5. Therefore, the universe is the product of an Intelligent Designer.

The intelligibility, order, and fine-tuning of the universe is almost beyond question. From the complexity of a single cell to planetary orbits, the universe displays a tremendous amount of regularity and order. The best evidence for this are the cosmic constants that are fine-tuned for the sustenance of life. In other words, certain fundamental parameters and initial conditions in the nature of the universe are essential in order to harbor life (i.e., it is crucial that they are as they are – any change would prohibit life as we know it). There are numerous constants that must be in place, within an extremely narrow range, for the universe to be hospitable to life. Here are just a few:

• Gravitational constant.
• Expansion rate of the universe (Einstein’s “cosmological constant”).
• Ratio of electromagnetic force to the force of gravity.
• Ratio of proton to electron mass.
• Fraction of the mass of hydrogen that is transformed into energy in the process of hydrogen fusion.
• Mass density of the universe.
• Unique properties of carbon, oxygen, and water.

The delicate balance of these cosmic constants is not controversial; the universe appears fine-tuned for intelligent life. The dispute is what to be made of them: whether they are due to physical necessity, chance, or a Cosmic Designer (God).

Physical necessity can be readily ruled out; for, according to this view, the constants must have the values they do. That is, the universe must permit life. However, a life-prohibiting universe does seem possible. Indeed, according to superstring theory, the most promising unified theory of the four fundamental forces of nature (gravity, electromagnetism, the strong nuclear force, and the weak nuclear force), an extremely high number of different possible universes (a wide range of values for the constants) are compatible with the laws of nature.

The main debate, then, is between chance and design. The fine-tuning is much more likely to be the result of design than the product of chance. William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland astutely assess the line of reasoning related to the anthropic principle: An observer who has evolved within the universe should regard it as highly probable that he will find the basic conditions of the universe fine-tuned for his existence; but he should not infer that it is therefore highly probable that such a fine-tuned universe exist at all. A universe that fosters life is highly improbable on the chance or atheistic hypothesis (the odds are overwhelmingly against it). Following a design inference or theism, however, it is not at all surprising that a good God would create a world that could support intelligent life. Thus, fine-tuning strongly supports design (theism) over chance (atheism).

Nevertheless, many scientists and philosophers have avoided the theistic conclusion of this argument by embracing the multiverse model or the world ensemble hypothesis. This hypothesis speculates an infinite number of alternate universes having a randomly selected set of initial conditions and values for the parameters of physics. The majority of these universes would not permit life, however, a small proportion of them would possess the right balance of cosmic constants to support life. In short, by exponentially increasing the number of occurrences the improbability that our universe would eventually exist just by chance is reduced. And, of course, this putatively revives the anthropic principle, which states that the properties of our universe are really not that surprising since we can only observe a world consistent with our own existence.

But is the multiverse model really more plausible than the design hypothesis? At least three reasons suggest that it is not. First, there is no evidentiary basis for supposing that these other universes actually exist; therefore, the multiverse hypothesis is no less metaphysical than the hypothesis of an Intelligent Designer. Second, no one has adequately explained how purely physical processes generate a world ensemble. The only remotely plausible (though highly speculative) explanation appeals to inflationary cosmology, which is itself a scenario that would seem to require well-designed mechanisms. In short, an inflationary-superstring many-universe generating process would be an irreducibly complex system that still suggests design. The case for design, then, would simply be pushed back a level. Third, the odds of our universe’s initial low-entropy condition obtaining solely by chance are inconceivably low according to Roger Penrose. Consequently, even if our universe where just one member of a world ensemble, it is far more probable that we should observe a much smaller universe than we in fact do. On the condition of naturalism, then, there is simply no getting around the fact that our vast, fine-tuned, low-entropy universe is extremely improbable.

One more objection must be considered. It is often argued that postulating the existence of God merely moves the debate up a notch. That is, if the complexity of the universe requires an explanation surely God needs one as well. After all, God must be at least as complex as the artifact he designed. This line of argument is flawed because the complexity of a mind is not the same as the complexity of the universe. The properties of an immaterial mind, such as intelligence and intentionality, are not contingent but essential to its nature. Thus, although the ideas of a highly intelligent mind are extraordinarily complex, such a mind is itself a relatively simple thing that requires no further explanation.

 

References:

Collins, Robin. “God, Design, and Fine-Tuning.” In God Matters: Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Raymond Martin and Christopher Bernard. New York: Longman Press, 2002.

Moreland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003.

The Kalam Cosmological Argument

The name of the cosmological argument is derived from the Greek word kosmos, which means “world” or “universe,” since the basic aim of the argument is to demonstrate that the universe has a cause. The specific version of the argument known as the kalam is designated with the Arabic word that refers to the medieval Islamic philosophy largely responsible for developing it. The core of this argument is the resolution of a series of three dilemmas: (1) either the universe had a beginning or no beginning, (2) if the universe had a beginning, either the beginning was caused or uncaused, (3) if the universe had a beginning that was caused, either the cause was personal or impersonal. Thus, the major premises of the argument are as follows:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
4. The cause of the universe can only be exemplified by a transcendent personal being.
5. Therefore, God exists.

Premise (1) is based on the metaphysical principle that something cannot come from nothing; being cannot come from non-being. This seems much more likely than its denial and is fairly uncontroversial. It does, however, presuppose the A-theory of time, which is a dynamic or tensed view of time. The theory holds that the tense distinction between past, present, and future is an objective reality and not merely a subjective feature of consciousness. (The B-theory of time, in contrast, maintains that all moments of time are static, tenseless, or equally existent).

Premise (2) is substantiated by four significant reasons: First, the universe cannot have an infinite past because an actual infinite seems impossible. That is, an actual infinite (vs. a potential infinite where infinity serves as a limit that is endlessly approached but never reached) cannot be instantiated into the spatiotemporal world (a real instance cannot occur in this world) without absurdities.

Second, even if an actual infinite can exist, a temporal series of events (the past) does not qualify as an actual infinite since an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition. In short, if the universe were an actual infinite or beginningless, in order for us to arrive at the present an infinite number of prior events would have to be traversed. But this is impossible, because there would always be one more event prior to the present (William Lane Craig compares this to trying to jump out of a bottomless pit). Since it is absurd to think we have not arrived at the present moment, the universe must have a beginning.

Third, the evidence for an expanding universe – best accounted for by the standard Big Bang model – supports the claim that the universe had a definite beginning out of nothing (ex nihilo). Again, the overwhelming consensus is that the Big Bang theory, in which all matter and energy (as well as time itself) came into being 13.73 billion years ago (plus or minus 120 million years), is best supported by all lines of scientific evidence and cosmological observations.

Finally, the second law of thermodynamics, which explains the irreversibility in nature, states that processes occurring in an isolated (closed) system always tend toward a state of equilibrium (entropy). The implication is that given enough time the entropy of the universe would increase such that all its processes would run down in a scenario known as heat death in which no further change is possible. The question is, if the universe did not begin to exist (if it has existed forever), why is it not now in a state of equilibrium?

Premise (3): It follows that if the universe had an absolute beginning, it is contingent and needs a transcendent cause (a contingent thing cannot cause itself).

Premise (4): This cause must also be accounted for in terms of a personal explanation, because the origin of the universe cannot have a scientific explanation in terms of laws and initial conditions (science presupposes matter and the laws of physics).

Conclusion: Therefore, this personal cause is most likely a single, very powerful, highly intelligent, nonphysical, free agent – what everyone understands to be God.

 

References:

Moreland, J.P. Scaling the Secular City: A Defense of Christianity. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1987.

Moreland, J.P. and William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003.

Sennett, James F. and Douglas Groothuis, eds. In Defense of Natural Theology: A Post-Humean Assessment. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2005.

Limitations of Natural Theology

Natural theology refers to what can be known about God through rational reflection on nature; it is distinguished from revealed theology, which is what can be known about God from Scripture. Arguments for God from nature – theistic proofs – can be deductive, inductive, or abductive (best explanation) in form (thus, the term proof is used in a loose sense). While I do not think such arguments compel belief in God (that is, one must assent to their truth or be irrational), I am convinced that they do make monotheism a rationally permissible worldview (one is well within his or her epistemic rights to believe in God). Moreover, the reasons natural theology may not compel belief tend to be complex. Such reasons may include bad arguments or at least bad presentations of good arguments, failure to fully understand certain premises of a valid argument, inability to recognize the proper strength of an argument, and/or comprehension but refusal to assent for moral reasons (not wanting to believe).

It is often stated that natural theology is misguided because finite human beings cannot possibly prove the existence of an infinite God; such knowledge is said to be beyond our ken. Although there is some merit to this view insofar as it reminds us to avoid presumption and overconfidence, agnosticism is not a very viable option (i.e., a skeptic still must determine how to live – one’s ethic will either be in relation to an objective moral lawgiver [theism] or not [atheism]). Thus, assertions and claims about God (or against God) are legitimate (if not unavoidable) with appropriate caution (e.g., fallibilism – I am justified in my belief that God exists even though further evidence may come in that would compel me to admit I am mistaken).

In short, human understanding is an ongoing, developmental process in which there is always more to be learned and explored. Since people often reject the truth because they do not want to accept the consequences of it, a humble disposition is required to free the intellect from things that obstruct understanding. Therefore, intellectual effort on its own is insufficient to attain understanding; one must also be in the appropriate epistemic position in order to receive it.

Within certain limitations, then, I believe it is possible to credibly contend for the existence of God and I intend to do so beginning with my next post (hopefully, I haven’t built this up too much or bored you already). In case you haven’t read the previously mentioned article, “God Is Not Dead Yet: How current philosophers argue for his existence” by William Lane Craig, it has now been posted online. Here is the link:

 http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2008/july/13.22.html